

Two Philosophical Problems in the Study of Happiness¹

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Abstract: In this paper I discuss two philosophical issues that hold special interest for empirical researchers studying happiness. The first issue concerns the question of how the psychological notion(s) of happiness invoked in empirical research relates to those traditionally employed by philosophers. The second concerns the question of how we *ought* to conceive of happiness, understood as a purely psychological phenomenon. With respect to the first, I argue that ‘happiness’, as used in the philosophical literature, has three importantly different senses that are often confused. Empirical research on happiness concerns only one of these senses, and serious misunderstandings about the significance of empirical results can arise from such confusion. I then argue that the second question is indeed philosophical and that, in order to understand the nature of (what I call) psychological happiness, we need first to determine what a theory of happiness is supposed to *do*: what are our theoretical and practical interests in the notion of happiness? I sketch an example of how such an inquiry might proceed, and argue that this approach can shed more light on the nature and significance of happiness (and related mental states) than traditional philosophical methods.

1. Introduction

It is often said that Socrates posed the defining question of ethics: How should I live?² Some 2400 years of subsequent philosophical inquiry into this matter has yielded few real answers, perhaps none. Thus an undergraduate course in ethics tends to be mostly a lesson in what we *don't* know about how to live: the good life is probably not lived in accordance with Mill's principle of utility; it is only dubiously guided by Kant's categorical imperative; and for all its appeal Aristotle's injunction to fulfill the human *telos* suffers from the fact that there isn't any such thing.³ Moreover, the focus is almost always on the purely moral dimensions of the good life, as if the purpose of ethical inquiry is simply to produce a handbook for aspiring saints. But the good life has other dimensions, notably the prudential (i.e., that concerned with well-being). One might have thought that among the central aspects of Socrates' question would be: What manner of living will make me *happiest*? Yet about this and related questions modern philosophers have had little of significance to say.

Luckily, empirical researchers *have* recently begun to say some interesting things about it, and by all indications we are on the verge of actually being able to answer it in substantial respects. After some two and a half millennia of unrelenting embarrassment, we may at last pro-

¹ Originally published in *The Journal of Happiness Studies*, 1:2 (2000), pp. 207-225.

² Plato (1992).

³ Adherents of one of these theories can still reflect on the fact that, whichever it is, most philosophers believe it to be false. Contrast this with the situation in, say, physics.

duce definitive answers to a great part of Socrates' question. For this to happen, however, we shall need to make a great deal of progress, not only in empirical research, but in our philosophical understanding of the subject matter. In what follows I shall discuss two of the more pressing philosophical issues now facing the interdisciplinary study of happiness. My aim is to combat some of the more troubling confusions that may hamper further inquiry, as well as to sketch a methodology for determining how we ought to conceive of happiness.

2. "I understand 'New Year', but what do you mean by 'happy'?"⁴

2.1 The three things called happiness

Probably the most common response of philosophers when confronted with empirical results that purport to reveal something about the character of happiness is to ask what on earth one means by 'happiness'. Or simply to assert: "But *that* isn't really happiness." It is doubtful that anyone working in this area is unaware of the linguistic difficulties surrounding the use of 'happiness', and indeed researchers tend to use more technical terminology in their work for precisely this reason. Still, there are serious problems lurking here, and it is imperative that the meanings of our terms be made as clear as possible. I have argued elsewhere that 'happiness' has at least three important senses in philosophical usage.⁵ With which sense is happiness studies concerned?

Commentators quite frequently cite famous historical figures such as Thomas Jefferson and Aristotle, with the explicit or implicit understanding that their work concerns the very same questions that engaged these thinkers under the rubric of 'happiness' (either originally or in translation). This belief is mistaken. Suppose, for instance, that happiness really is determined mostly by hereditary and developmental factors, so that trying to be happier is, as Lykken and Tellegen suggested, "just as futile as trying to be taller."⁶ One might suppose that this result would be devastating for Aristotle's views about happiness, as it would render useless almost all of his advice about how we ought to conduct our lives. For he believed that happiness (*eudaimonia*) is the sole end of all human action, and thus sought to show how we ought to live if we are to attain this end. But if there's nothing we can do to make ourselves happier, then his counsels only offer advice that we can't possibly follow. The goodness of our lives for us is, in short, not something over which we have any real control. Likewise, Jefferson's concern to establish a republic in which people are free to pursue happiness would be reduced to an absurdity, for happiness is not something to be pursued at all. Or so one might argue.

The trouble is that these arguments rest on an equivocation: the happiness of Lykken and Tellegen is something very different from what Aristotle, and almost certainly Jefferson, were talking about. The happiness that concerned the latter two thinkers is not simply a psychological matter, if it is psychological at all, but rather an evaluative matter. In particular, it concerns a kind of well-being: namely the condition of leading a particularly successful, fortunate, or enviable life. It concerns, more or less, the question of what sort of life makes a person *better off*. This, notice, is not an empirical psychological question, but rather a question for ethics: a question of value. Now some reputable thinkers, notably the hedonistic utilitarians such as Bentham and Sidgwick, have notoriously maintained that such a life requires only desirable states of con-

⁴ This line is taken from a cartoon by Matt Groening.

⁵ "Three Things Called Happiness" (unpublished ms-c).

⁶ Lykken and Tellegen (1996). Never mind that this claim is false, as Lykken himself has since observed (1999). The point is simply to illustrate how empirical results might be taken to have implications that they do not.

sciousness—e.g., pleasure. What doesn't make my experience more or less pleasant, on such a view, thus makes no difference to my well-being or the enviability of my life. Most people, however, think this position too extreme by far: most of us care about how things *really are* in our lives, and not just how they *seem* to be. A woman who is blissfully unaware of her husband's treachery and hatred for her is nonetheless considerably worse off for all that. Or imagine a disembodied brain that has been placed in a vat and connected to various devices that produce in it all the sensations a person normally experiences. If not somehow appraised of its situation, it might have no idea and be quite cheerful and contented. Yet if it were to find out, it would likely be completely devastated by the knowledge. (Recall the recent film *The Truman Show*, in which the title character grows up not realizing that his life is essentially a television show, and that his "family" and "friends" are just hired actors.) In short, individuals whose pleasant states of mind depend on their being radically deluded about their circumstances do not seem to be leading good or enviable lives in any sense at all.

Happiness in the Aristotelian or Jeffersonian sense, then, appears to require more than states of mind. Rather, it concerns the whole character of a person's life. Yet the happiness of Lykken and Tellegen is purely a psychological matter, and the idea that a radically deceived individual might be happy in their sense is no objection to their view at all. Indeed, this possibility is a *presupposition* of any inquiry into the character of happiness in this sense. The psychological aspects of *eudaimonia* were not unimportant for Aristotle, but they were clearly peripheral: pleasure, he tells us, merely "supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age."⁷ What *is* central to Aristotelian happiness is living in a manner that actively expresses excellence of character or virtue. And the bearing of Lykken and Tellegen's claim on this question is not at all obvious. One can presumably exhibit human excellence *whether or not* one has a cheerful or serene disposition. Perhaps Aristotle would have disagreed with this, but that is an exegetical question that distracts from the real issue: the happiness that concerns Lykken and Tellegen is at best only a *part* of the happiness that concerned Aristotle. We could likely make similar claims for Jefferson, who probably would have denied that the brain in a vat or the deluded spouse has been successful in the pursuit of happiness.

In fact the part/whole comparison is misleading, as the relation between these two happinesses is not even that close. For most empirical researchers would probably regard the question of what happiness is to be substantially an empirical question: to determine what happiness is, we need to find out what psychological kind (if any) answers to certain paradigmatic uses of 'happiness', 'happy', etc.⁸ And an answer to this question will in turn depend on what human psychology is like. Notice how different this is from the question that animates theorists working in the Aristotelian mold: to determine what happiness in *this* sense is, we need to find out what sorts of things make people's lives *go better for them*. This is a question of value. In principle, it is possible that we could answer this question without considering hedonic and related psychological matters at all. (Maybe, if we are ascetics, cheery feelings and the like are actually *bad* for us. Or maybe they are simply irrelevant, as the Stoics maintained.)

The important thing to notice is that Lykken and Tellegen and a latter-day Aristotelian could have completely different accounts of what they call happiness *without having any substantive disagreement whatsoever*. Indeed, one could consistently maintain that what Lykken and Tellegen call happiness consists in subjective well-being while at the same time agreeing with

⁷ *Nicomachean Ethics* 1174b 34.

⁸ This is essentially the approach to theorizing about the emotions defended by Paul Griffiths in his excellent book, *What Emotions Really Are* (1997).

Aristotelians that happiness consists in a life of virtue. They are talking about entirely distinct, if related, things using the same word. *Qua* theorists of things called happiness, they are not in the same business at all. Similarly, one could consistently hold Jones to be at the (First National) bank whilst denying that he is at the (river) bank. I shall refer to the psychological sense of happiness as denoting *psychological happiness*,⁹ whereas the sense that concerns a kind of well-being denotes *prudential happiness*.¹⁰ The notions of psychological and prudential happiness are not different theories, or conceptions, of happiness; they are different *concepts* altogether, and denote different things.¹¹ Psychological happiness is almost certainly quite important to prudential happiness—perhaps more important than anything else—but it is not the same thing. Though the hedonistic utilitarians did maintain that psychological happiness exhausts prudential happiness—though not of course in so those terms—this claim expresses not an identity of meaning but rather the quite controversial ethical view that a certain mentalistic kind is the only thing that matters for a certain kind of value (well-being). Note that the Epicureans made roughly the same substantive claim as the hedonistic utilitarians, but their ‘happiness’ (rather, ‘*eudaimonia*’) meant something from what the utilitarian ‘happiness’ apparently means: prudential happiness, not psychological happiness. (However, there is some reason to think that Mill at least used the term in a prudential sense, as I remarked in recent footnote.) No wonder there has been so much confusion!

There is a third, and I believe deviant, usage of ‘happiness’ in the philosophical literature. This usage, which expresses what I call *perfectionist happiness*, is concerned not with a psychological kind, nor with a kind of well-being or success in life, but rather with a life that is good in *all* respects in which a life can be considered good, including morally—a life that is desirable without qualification, both enviable *and* admirable.¹² That happiness in this sense requires mo-

⁹ I shall not attempt to catalog all authors who have written on things called happiness in this paper, but it is worth mentioning some of them. Philosophers concerned with psychological happiness probably include Benditt (1974; 1978), Carson (1978a; 1978b; 1979; 1981), Davis (1981b; 1981a), Gauthier (1967), Griffin (1986), Mayerfeld (1996; 1999), Montague (1967), Nozick (1989), Rescher (1972; 1980), Sen (1987), Sumner (1996), Telfer (1980), Von Wright (1963), Wilson (1968), and Wolf (1997). Theorists who take well-being to consist in psychological happiness appear to include Barrow (1980; 1991), Bentham (1969), Brandt (1979; 1989; 1992), Campbell (1973), Ebenstein (1991), Hobbes (1962), Locke, Meynell (1969), Sidgwick (1966), and Sprigge (1991).

¹⁰ The term ‘prudential’ is commonly used nowadays by philosophers to refer to the realm of well-being broadly construed. It need not involve a concern with selfish interests alone. Theorists of prudential happiness probably include most or all of the ancients and many scholars of ancient ethics (e.g., Annas (1993; 1998); but cf. Cooper (1975) for an example of dissent about translating ‘*eudaimonia*’ as ‘happiness’), medievals, many virtue theorists, and Thomists (see Hudson (1996) for a discussion of recent Thomistic work). Additionally, Almeder (2000), Cottingham (1998), Edwards (1979), Gert (1988), Hill (1999), Jacobs (1985), Kant, Kekes (1982; 1988; 1992), Kenny (1966), Kraut (1979), Luper (1996), Mill (1979), Rawls (1971), Scruton (1975), Simpson (1975), Spinoza, Tatarkiewicz (1976), Thomas (1968), and Warner (1987). Perhaps also Hare (1963) and Smart (1973), although their views are difficult to classify. I count Mill in this group because his defense of the doctrine of qualitative hedonism suggests an *a priori* insistence that happiness, whatever it is, *must* be a kind of well-being.

¹¹ Indeed, it is probably incorrect even to refer to them as different *kinds* of happiness. They seem rather to be different things, period, though it is conceivable that they are different species of a single genus.

¹² This term is not ideal, as many theorists, such as Plato, are perfectionists about *prudential* happiness. This is a much-disputed ethical claim to the effect that well-being requires perfection of character. Whereas perfectionist happiness involves no such claim, but simply denotes the condition of leading a comprehensively good life. Here the perfection is *stipulated* and therefore not up for debate. (Note that perfectionist happiness is distinct from ethical perfectionism. It is not an ethical doctrine but merely a synonym or near-synonym for ‘the good life’.) Theorists of perfectionist happiness appear to include Austin (1968), Goldstein (1973), Grice (unpublished, cited at length in Warner 1986; 1991), and McFall (1989). Perhaps also Hare (1963), Hudson (1996), and Smart (1973). Mele (1979) argues that the Aristotelian notion of happiness is perfectionist, but I am skeptical.

rality is a trivial conceptual truth, not a substantive claim about whether morality makes us better off. (At least, insofar as it is good to be moral.) It is doubtful whether any significant historical figure was concerned with happiness in this sense (at least under the guise of ‘happiness’ or its cognates in other languages). Though Plato did think that happiness required morality, this was hardly a triviality for him: it took the whole of the *Republic* to try to establish, and even then he failed (if magnificently). His concern was with whether morality benefits us—with whether it is necessary for happiness in the *prudential* sense. In the perfectionist sense of ‘happiness’, happiness will often prove *contrary* to our interests—namely, whenever it is better for us to act against our interests. This strikes me as no kind of happiness at all.¹³ For our purposes, it suffices to note that it differs from the other two things called happiness.

Here is a quick and dirty way of determining which, if any, of these three things a given theorist’s use of ‘happiness’ concerns. Say a theorist claims that happiness consists in being F. Is the happiness in question perfectionist, prudential, or psychological? Just ask what sort of evidence might count against the view that happiness is F:

1. Suppose we were to discover that one could achieve happiness *according to this view* yet not in fact be leading a good life (good, that is, without qualification). Would that *prove* this view to be false?¹⁴ If so, then ‘happiness’ denotes perfectionist happiness.
2. Suppose we were to discover that one could achieve happiness *according to this view* yet not in fact be faring well (flourishing, in a high state of well-being, etc.). Would that *prove* this view to be false? If so, and if the answer to question one is “no,” then ‘happiness’ denotes prudential happiness.
3. If the answer to both questions is “no,” *and* if F is a psychological state, then ‘happiness’ (probably) denotes psychological happiness.¹⁵

A pair of examples can help illustrate the way this works: the brain in a vat, and the evil person. Suppose one thinks, as most people do, that a brain in a vat would not be well off or leading a good life, however blissful its ignorance might be. And suppose that the evil person does quite well—indeed, flourishes—though his or her life, being morally monstrous, is not a good one at all. Could the evil character, thus described, possibly attain happiness?¹⁶ If not, then we can only be talking about perfectionist happiness. Could the brain in a vat possibly attain happiness? If so, then we are almost certainly talking about psychological happiness. If the evil person could attain happiness, but the brain in a vat could not, then our subject matter is prudential happiness.

These questions will not always have easy answers—save, we can hope, in one’s *own* case—since theorists are often obscure about where, if anywhere, they stand on these questions. (Mill, for instance, who may or may not have warranted a “yes” to the first question.¹⁷) These are awfully big questions to be unclear about, but such is the unhappy state of theorizing about happiness.

¹³ I defend this claim at greater length in “Three Things Called Happiness” (unpublished ms-c).

¹⁴ That is, would it be *logically* or conceptually inconsistent with the idea that happiness is F? The question is not merely: would it count against the idea that happiness is F?

¹⁵ “Probably,” because ‘happiness’ might be used in some deviant manner not covered in this taxonomy. I am assuming that only philosophically interesting things called happiness are in question here. These criteria are not meant to apply to cases in which ‘happiness’ is used to denote, say, the particular emotion of feeling happy. All the theories in question take appraisals of happiness to involve typically long-term states of great importance.

¹⁶ Never mind whether my description of this character is itself ruled out by the theory (as happens, for instance, with Plato). It will still be *intelligible*, and even Plato could ask what would happen if it *were* true.

¹⁷ I explain in “Three Things Called Happiness.”

2.2 Some terminological considerations and their non-terminological significance

Perhaps we can reserve ‘happiness’ for just one of these senses, and use different terms for the others. Maybe, but the problem is that both the psychological and prudential senses appear to be well-entrenched in contemporary English, and each has its partisans.¹⁸ Recall the blissfully ignorant brain in a vat: it seems to me perfectly natural to say that it is happy. Yet it also seems plausible to deny that it could be leading a happy *life*: life is not going at all well for this poor soul, whose predicament is about as unenviable as can be. A happy person, in other words, might nonetheless lead a very unhappy life. There should be nothing particularly shocking about this. Taken as a property of a *person*, happiness might plausibly be viewed as a purely mentalistic affair. But taken as a property of a person’s *life*, mentalism loses credibility: there is surely more to people’s lives than their states of mind. What actually happens to us is hardly irrelevant to the stories of our lives.

We may well wish to avoid confusion by reserving ‘happiness’ and its cognates for the psychological notion. However, I suspect that such a move would meet with resistance, particularly from scholars of Ancient Greek philosophy. Barring that, I suggest we use the locution ‘leading a happy life’ and similar expressions only for the prudential sense, while describing individuals using ‘happy’ only in the psychological sense. The abstract noun ‘happiness’ presents further challenges, as it tends somewhat to evoke the prudential notion (e.g., “The layoff completely undermined his chances for attaining happiness”). And it is not clear that we can readily substitute other terms for either notion, though perhaps we can refer to prudential happiness as simply “well-being” or “flourishing.”¹⁹ The most sensible thing is probably to use unambiguous language where possible, and be clear about what one means by ‘happiness’ where it is not. In most cases the context, along with the likely presence of the non-abstract expressions (e.g., ‘happy’), should provide clarification enough.

Of greater concern than such verbal matters is the question of how we are to understand happiness studies in relation to the work of historical thinkers. I take it that the ‘happiness’ of ‘happiness studies’ expresses the psychological notion, given the focus on purely psychological matters and the standard practice in the scientific literature of regarding happiness as a psychological kind. Yet many modern thinkers, and all of the premoderns, used the term—and those terms we use ‘happiness’ to translate—to express the prudential notion: for them happiness is first and last a matter of one’s life going well for one. To speak as if happiness studies is concerned with the same questions that interested them is to speak a half-truth: conceived as the study of psychological happiness, happiness studies covers at best only a part of what interested them—namely, that part of a brain in a vat’s life that might be said to be going well for it. In short, we should be very cautious in drawing comparisons between current research and the work of historical authors. It is badly misleading to quote some ancient authority on happiness and then, without indicating that one now uses the term with a completely different meaning, assert that psychological research on, say, happiness set points, is telling us new things about happiness. For one thing, the equivocation may tempt the reader to see confirmations or refutations of historical views where there aren’t any (recall the discussion of Lykken and Tellegen and Aristotle).

¹⁸ Though I think the psychological sense is far more prevalent, and would be perfectly happy see the prudential sense disappear altogether. An interesting question concerns the extent to which these difficulties transfer to other languages.

¹⁹ In fact I shall sometimes use ‘well-being’ interchangeably with ‘prudential happiness’. I actually doubt the two expressions are synonymous, but they should be close enough for our purposes.

3. What is happiness, and how do we tell?

Such equivocations are also a cheap way to inflate the apparent significance of our work. But our subject matter is not *that* important. And yet neither, I would add, is that of physics, biology, history, or just about any other academic field. That there exists *something* more important than what we are studying is scarcely a harsh rebuke of our efforts. And there are few things, maybe just two, that surpass prudential happiness in significance.²⁰ In turn it seems likely that psychological happiness—our subject matter—is the single most important aspect of well-being. This is especially plausible if we consider it from a practical standpoint: most of us, thank heaven, aren't brains in vats. From the viewpoint of normally situated individuals trying to decide how to go through life *as it actually confronts them*, it is doubtful that many choices that lead to (psychological) happiness²¹ would fail to yield a broader kind of well-being as well. Secure happiness and the other prudential goods will likely follow. Moreover, happiness is a relatively specific quantity, and plausibly a simpler object for practical deliberation than the comparatively abstract phenomenon of well-being. If this is correct, then the question of what way of life will make one happiest may be second only to that of what manner of living would be most admirable or virtuous as a matter of practical consideration when confronted with Socrates' question.

Actually, whether this assertion is correct depends substantially on what, exactly, happiness is. There are five basic views on this. The two best-known accounts are the *life satisfaction* and *hedonistic* theories. The former is fairly self-explanatory, though it is worth distinguishing the idea of being satisfied *with* one's life as a whole from that of *feeling* satisfied, period; the life satisfaction view concerns the former.²² The hedonistic theory, by contrast, reduces happiness to a subject's balance of pleasure over displeasure.²³

A third theory, the *affective state* view, takes happiness to consist in a subject's emotional state. This view differs from hedonism in some important ways. For instance, it incorporates emotions and moods themselves, whereas hedonism includes only experiences—viz.,

²⁰ The candidates that come to mind are the life that is good *tout court*, without qualification, and the life that is at least virtuously conducted.

²¹ I shall henceforth drop the qualifier 'psychological' for the most part.

²² Philosophical proponents of life satisfaction theories (of psychological happiness) appear to include Barrow (1980; 1991); Benditt (1974; 1978); Montague (1967); Rescher (1972; 1980); Telfer (1980); and Von Wright (1963). Probably also Nozick (1989), though it is not clear whether he is concerned with psychological happiness. Casual references elsewhere frequently assume a life satisfaction view. Empirical researchers often equate life satisfaction and happiness, though it is more common for them to equate happiness with affective state or the notion of subjective well-being. (Cf. Cummins (1998). Alex Michalos has long maintained that life satisfaction and happiness are distinct, with happiness taking something like an affective state form (Michalos 1980). Subjective well-being may itself be regarded as a kind of life satisfaction theory depending on how we conceive the two things. For instance, subjective well-being is often described as a person's evaluation of his or her life, incorporating affect, global attitudes, and domain satisfactions (e.g., Diener, Suh et al. (1999), and Diener and Diener (1998).) Ruut Veenhoven (1984; 1997) is one of the more prominent exponents of the life satisfaction view in the social sciences.

²³ Hedonism about (psychological) happiness is not to be confused with other, better-known varieties of hedonism: e.g., psychological hedonism, which claims that all action aims at pleasure; and ethical hedonism, which holds that all action *ought* to aim at pleasure. Philosophical proponents of hedonism about psychological happiness probably include such historical thinkers as Bentham, Locke, and Sidgwick; and more recently, Brandt (1959; 1967a; 1967b; 1979; 1989; 1992); Campbell (1973); Carson (1978a; 1978b; 1979; 1981); Davis (1981b; 1981a); Ebenstein (1991); Griffin (1979; 1986); Mayerfeld (1996; 1999); Sen (1987); Sprigge (1991); and Wilson (1968). Casual references to happiness in the philosophical literature frequently assume it to be hedonistic. Hedonism has adherents in psychology as well, such as Allen Parducci (1995) and Daniel Kahneman (1999).

pleasant and unpleasant ones.²⁴ Emotions and moods typically have experiential aspects, but also have nonconscious aspects that play an important role in determining their causal powers. Second, affective state theories can incorporate subjects' *dispositions* to experience emotions and moods; these obviously aren't experiences of any sort, much less pleasant or unpleasant ones. Third, hedonistic accounts standardly count all pleasures, whereas affective state theories exclude physical and intellectual pleasures except insofar as these have emotional aspects (e.g., reactions of wanting/liking). They may also exclude trivial emotional pleasures, focusing only on comparatively deep or strong emotions, or even solely on moods. Some sort of affective state view appears to be the most common account among empirical researchers, though there has not been much explicit discussion of this theory, and indeed it has probably been confused with hedonism by many commentators.²⁵ This may explain the almost complete absence of any philosophical proponents of this theory, although I defend a version of the affective state view elsewhere.²⁶

A fourth theory, the *perceived desire satisfaction* account, analyzes happiness in terms of the perceived satisfaction of one's desires. To be happy is just to believe, for most of one's desires (or perhaps just one's important desires), that they are being (have been) satisfied. This view, however, has had few recent proponents and is the least credible of the alternatives.²⁷ Finally there are *hybrid* views, with subjective well-being as the best-known version of such an account.²⁸ On such a theory happiness is taken to consist in some combination of life satisfaction and affective or hedonic state, perhaps along with other states such as satisfaction with particular life domains. Because hedonic state and affective state have not been clearly distinguished in the literature, it is not clear which of these subjective well-being incorporates.

It probably goes without saying that it matters to happiness studies which, if any, of these theories is correct. Unfortunately, attempts to settle this question are notoriously plagued by the diversity of people's intuitions about happiness and the seeming arbitrariness of the choice. Some find life satisfaction views to be intuitively correct, while others' intuitions favor affective state theories. Since most philosophical work on happiness has aimed solely at producing intuitively plausible analyses of the ordinary language term 'happiness' and its cognates, this state of affairs is not encouraging.

One alternative would be to follow recent philosophical fashion and defer to our best scientific theories: happiness just is whatever empirical investigation reveals it to be. The best conception of happiness is the one that figures in our best scientific accounts. By itself, this approach would fare little better than pure analysis. For one thing, the variety of candidate theories puts the lie to such ambitions: how could it *possibly* be merely an empirical question whether happiness is pleasure or life satisfaction? These are awfully different things; there can hardly be

²⁴ Strictly speaking, hedonism may also include *reactions* of liking/wanting towards experiences. But this does not affect the present point.

²⁵ I discuss this point in "Happiness and Pleasure" (forthcoming), where I argue against hedonism.

²⁶ "A Theory of Happiness (and Maybe Depression)" (unpublished ms-b).

²⁷ David Gauthier (1967) appears to hold such a view, and Wayne Davis (1981b; 1981a) defends this sort of account under the rubric of hedonism (he defines pleasure in terms of beliefs about desire satisfaction).

²⁸ L.W. Sumner is one philosopher who appears to defend this sort of view of happiness (1996), though he describes it as a life satisfaction theory. (As I noted in an earlier footnote, subjective well-being might itself be regarded as a kind of life satisfaction.) It is not entirely clear who else endorses it, since empirical researchers who use 'happiness' and 'subjective well-being' interchangeable often seem to construe happiness differently in other places. Ed Diener is one prominent psychologist who frequently identifies happiness and subjective well-being (e.g., (1998)), but like many researchers he is not particularly committed to the identification. For the most part, empirical researchers have (wisely) avoided taking a firm stand on the definition of happiness.

some one thing that empirical investigation might reveal to be either pleasure or life satisfaction. (Compare the idea that we might need to perform experiments to determine whether water is a liquid or a kind of bicycle. Someone wondering about such things had best do some philosophy, or better yet consult a dictionary, before breaking out the instruments.) The problem is that ‘happiness’ appears to cover so much psychological ground in ordinary usage that we aren’t even sure what the “it” is whose nature empirical research might discover. Science needs to know where to look before it can disclose nature’s secrets.

A second difficulty is that happiness—even conceived as a psychological kind²⁹—is first and foremost a matter of *practical* concern. What scientific researchers find most useful or interesting for their purposes may have little bearing on our practical interests—viz., in leading good lives. What if, for instance, certain mental states essential to well-being were unmeasurable, while other significant—but less important—states were quite easily assessed by objective methods? We should expect scientific theories, which may have little to say about the former, to focus on the latter. But it may well be the unmeasurable state that laypersons and value theorists care most about. In short, the states preferred by scientific theories may well differ from those preferred by laypersons and value theorists. Deferring wholly to empirical research may leave us with a theory of happiness that does relatively little to help us address our practical concerns.

We can do better. As the foregoing comments indicate, this requires that we proceed with our inquiry in the context of *why happiness matters*. More generally, we need to consider the question of happiness as a question for a broader domain of inquiry that concerns matters of value as much as those of mind: the psychology of well-being. (What I suggest we call “prudential psychology,” following the current philosophical practice of using ‘prudential’ to denote matters of well-being.) And the central question for this field is, What are the psychological states that are important for well-being? This in turn prompts more specific questions, and in seeking answers to them we are likely to find that some theories of happiness are better than others: they perform the work we want from a theory of happiness better than their alternatives. To illustrate: individuals trying to decide on an occupation frequently ask such questions as: In what vocation will I be happier? This is a common and important concern involving happiness. Other things being equal, we should prefer a theory that vindicates and makes sense of our interest in such questions over one that does not.

But this is just to say that we should prefer a conception of happiness that makes it important if not central to well-being.³⁰ The notion should also be *useful* for such purposes as practical deliberation. For example, it ought to make sense for us to ask questions such as which occupation would make one happier. There ought to be some fact of the matter about such questions, at least enough of the time to make these questions worth asking. It therefore will not do to have a notion of happiness that does not come in degrees. Nor should the notion of being (more or less) happy or unhappy be inapplicable to most people most of the time. If it were, then questions about which option would best contribute to one’s happiness would typically be pointless: for the concept of being more or less happy or unhappy would not apply at all no matter what

²⁹ By ‘psychological kind’ I do not mean that happiness must be a kind that figures in the theories of scientific psychology. Perhaps the notion is essentially nonscientific, of interest solely for folk psychological or value-theoretic purposes. I mean only that happiness is a largely or wholly psychological matter, *pace* prudential or perfectionist happiness.

³⁰ I hope it is clear that this is consistent with holding that the notion of happiness is nonevaluative. Compare: would we find a theory of emotions plausible if it implied that emotions had no value at all? Of course not; but from this it would not follow that *emotion* is an evaluative concept. Some things happen to be important without being *defined* in terms of their importance.

one does. (Policymakers would face similar difficulties in assessing the impact of policies on their constituencies' happiness: there generally won't be any.) And what mostly doesn't exist, and is not likely to exist no matter what one does, is not much worth worrying about. Suppose, for instance, that we find a life satisfaction theory of happiness attractive. If so, then it had better turn out that people often enough have determinate attitudes of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their lives. If people typically lack such attitudes, then there will be little point in concerning ourselves with how our choices impact on them. At least, the utility of such questions will be greatly reduced from what we might have hoped.

Focusing on substantive criteria such as value and practical utility can go a long way in helping us to understand the nature of happiness. For example, I argue elsewhere that life satisfaction theories of happiness confront a dilemma: depending on how we understand the notion of life satisfaction, we get the result that life satisfaction (dissatisfaction, etc.) is either too uncommon for the notion to be very useful (since people generally lack the requisite attitudes); or it is common, but far less valuable than we would expect happiness to be (since the relevant attitude can coexist with a highly negative affective state).³¹ It would be nice if we could find a plausible account of happiness that does not suffer from such difficulties. I shall not explain or defend this claim here; the point is merely to indicate how we might go about choosing a theory of happiness without relying solely on linguistic or conceptual analysis.³²

4. Conclusion

The foregoing discussion illustrates a couple of the most important contributions that philosophers can make to the interdisciplinary study of happiness right now. We need, first, a better understanding of what we *want* from a theory of happiness. Our answer to this question can then help us to answer the second: which view, or views, of happiness best satisfy the theoretical and practical needs thus identified?³³ (We may, when all is said and done, wish to distinguish multiple varieties of happiness, or even eliminate the term altogether.) Settling these questions is significant, not simply for learning about the character of happiness. It is essential to understanding the psychology of well-being. (Not least because the various candidate theories of happiness pretty well cover the range of psychological states that seem to be important for well-being.) And it is necessary if we are to know what to make of the discoveries of empirical researchers—what, that is, these results tell us about happiness, well-being, and the good life.

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³¹ "Happiness and the Importance of Life Satisfaction" (unpublished ms-a).

³² In all fairness, I should note that proponents of hedonism may at least tacitly rely on principled grounds for their views—e.g., that the hedonistic notion best suits the needs of hedonistic utilitarianism. However, there is rarely if ever any attempt to seriously defend the idea that these are the right or only needs to consider. Thus hedonism is typically just assumed or stipulated, as if the notion of happiness is either obviously hedonistic or simply up for grabs.

³³ We need not necessarily settle the first question before starting into the second. For we may only discover certain of our interests in happiness while considering the merits of specific views.

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